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background: Authorities concerned by rising healthcare costs have a tendency to target reproductive treatments because of the per-
ception that infertility is a low priority. In 2004 German health authorities introduced a 50% co-payment for patients, in an effort to save cost.
We explored the impact of this pricing policy on the utilization of reproductive treatments in Germany.
methods: Using aggregated annual in-vitro fertilization (IVF) and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) cycle data in Germany, we eval-
uated the relationship between changes in the number of cycles in relation to changes in costs faced by consumers following the introduction
of a patient co-payment from ‘no fees’ to E1500–2000 by estimating the short-run price-elasticity of demand. The impact of introducing
patient co-payments for IVF/ICSI on the likelihood of switching to other low-cost fertility treatments was evaluated using the cross-price
elasticity methodology.
results: The reduction in demand for IVF and ICSI cycles in the year following the introduction of patient co-payments resulted in elas-
ticities of 20.41 and 20.34, respectively. The price-elasticity for the combined reduction of IVF/ICSI in relation to the co-payment was
estimated to be 20.36. The cross-price elasticity for clomifene was close to zero (20.01) suggesting that demand for these interventions
are independent of each other and no substitution occurred.
conclusions: We report price elasticities for IVF and ICSI of 20.41 and 20.34 after introducing a E1500–2000 co-payment. These
ﬁndings likely represent short-run elasticities that are likely to vary over time as factors that inﬂuence the supply and demand for fertility
treatments change.
Key words: price-elasticity / cross-price elasticity / co-payment / in-vitro fertilization / fertility treatments
Introduction
Over the past decade demand for (i.e. utilization of) assisted repro-
ductive technologies (ART) has steadily increased (Andersen et al.,
2007, 2008). Demand for ART has increased for a variety of
reasons including couples delaying time to ﬁrst pregnancy and conse-
quently increasing the reliance on ART, an increasing public awareness
regarding available treatments, a generous public subsidy in some
countries, and a growing acceptance of the technology for conceiving
children (Heck et al., 1997; Adashi et al., 2000).
Despite increasing demand for treatment, the provision of services
by national and private health insurers is often limited (Jones and
Cohen, 2004; McWhirter and McQueen, 2000). The primary
reasons for not funding or for limiting funds through public and
private health services are costs and the perception that infertility is
not a disease (Redmayne and Klein, 1993). In many cases, the neces-
sity to allocate scarce resources to those deemed of most need has
led to the establishment of criteria for rationing treatments
(Kennedy et al., 2006). For those unable to access publicly subsidized
treatments, affordability can be a problem and as a result many
infertile couples go without treatment or discontinue treatment
(Dawson et al., 2005; Rajkhowa et al., 2005).
Because costs and affordability are important factors that can inﬂu-
ence a couple’s access to treatment, it is important to understand the
relationship between prices and consumer demand. The demand for
any product or service reﬂects the relationship between the quantity
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consumed at any given price and ART is likely no exception. To under-
stand this relationship, economists often measure the change in quan-
tity demanded in response to a price change to establish the
price-elasticity of demand (Tewari and Singh, 2003). This is a simple
ratio of the change in demand over a period of time in relation to
changes in price over the same period of time to explain how respon-
sive demand is in relation to its price. Price elasticity estimates are
used by policy-makers and commercial analysts to predict how
future price changes, in this case patient co-payments, are likely to
inﬂuence demand for products and potential revenue consequences
in the case of commercial organizations.
With the above points in mind, we sought to measure the
price-elasticity of demand associated with a policy intervention in
Germany that required couples to pay 50% of the costs for in-vitro fer-
tilization (IVF) and intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) from January
2004 onwards (Thaele and Uszkoreit, 2007). This natural experiment
provides us with an opportunity to assess the price-elasticity of
demand for IVF and ICSI based on changes in utilization of fertility
treatments observed following introduction of the co-payment. Fur-
thermore, to assess how patients and doctors respond to high
co-payment charges, we evaluated whether changes in IVF/ICSI
co-payments would affect the demand for alternative cheaper but
less effective fertility treatments such as clomifene.
Materials and Methods
This study was a retrospective analysis on the number of IVF and ICSI
cycles in Germany reported by the Deutsches IVF registry (DIR) for the
period from 1999 up to and including 2004 (DIR, 2004; DIR, 2005).
The dates were selected to provide a historical perspective to the
growth in use of IVF and ICSI prior to introduction of the German health-
care modernization law which mandated a 50% co-payment for all treat-
ment costs in January 2004 for publicly insured couples. All IVF/ICSI
clinics in Germany are required by law to report utilization statistics to
the DIR, therefore providing comprehensive statistics on the annual
number of cycles performed. The DIR cycle data is available in aggregated
format for all cycles, both self paid and reimbursed, although the majority
of cycles in Germany are conducted within the public reimbursement
system (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007; GBE, 2006).
The primary price-elasticity estimates were based on IVF/ICSI volumes
changes observed between 2003 and 2004 which corresponds with the
introduction of the co-payment. However, to account for the demand
surge that occurred in 2003 prior to implementing the policy reform, a
second price-elasticity calculation was derived based on the average
annualized growth in the 5 years prior to the co-payment being
introduced. The cycle volume data on which the elasticity estimates are
based are provided in Table I.
Price-elasticity of demand equation
To estimate the responsiveness of consumer demand to changes in prices
two methodologies are commonly used to estimate the price-elasticity of
demand: (1) ‘arc’ price-elasticity of demand and (2) ‘point’ price-elasticity
of demand. For our purposes, the arc methodology is better suited for
considering large increases in price as were experienced in Germany in
2004 (Quesada, 2002; Tewari and Singh, 2003; Chambers et al., 2009).
For criticisms of the arc methodology, interested readers are referred to
the publication by Sa´nchez-Moreno and Ruiz-Tamarit (2002).
The formula for deriving the ratio of change in cycles to change in price
is shown below. The elasticity of demand (Ed) is the ratio between the
changes in demand for IVF and ICSI treatments in relation to the change
in price paid by patients over the same period of time. The equation
uses the average of the initial and ﬁnal quantities and average of initial
and ﬁnal patient co-payments (i.e. price) for the base estimates.
Ed ¼ DQ=Qav
DP=Pav
Ed ¼ ðQ2 Q1Þ=½ðQ1þ Q2Þ=2ðP2 P1Þ=½ðP1þ P2Þ=2
Q1 is the number of cycles prior to the co-payment; Q2 is the number of
cycles after the 50% co-payment; P1 is the price paid by patients for IVF
and ICSI price before the co-payment; P2 is the price paid by patients
after introducing the co-payment.
Since the variable Q1 is the quantity demanded prior to the policy
change and Q2 is the quantity demanded after the policy, the change in
IVF/ICSI volumes (DQ) before and after the co-payment is ﬁrst derived
from Q2 to Q1. Because IVF/ICSI volumes decreased in response to intro-
ducing a co-payment, this results in a negative coefﬁcient. The change in
quantity is then divided by the average of the two quantities [(Q1þQ2)/
2] to derive the average change in quantity (Qav). A similar procedure is
followed using the P2 and P1 price points to derive the change in price
(DP) and the average change in price (Pav). The elasticity of demand is
then estimated from the ratio of change in quantity to the change in price.
Assessing treatment substitution using
cross-price elasticity
To assess how IVF and ICSI co-payments may inﬂuence demand for other
fertility treatments, the cross-price-elasticity of demand method can be
used. Cross-price elasticity evaluations are useful for highlighting how
price changes for one treatment can inﬂuence treatment choices for
other products or services. In our assessment, we looked at how introdu-
cing a 50% co-payment for IVF/ICSI inﬂuenced the demand for clomifene
.............................................................................................................................................................................................
Table I IVF and ICSI annual cycle volumes used to estimate price-elasticities
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
IVF cycles† 21 880 28 945 28 506 23 936 28 058 11 848
ICSI cycles† 21 224 15 752 24 897 37 692 51 389 25 339
Clomifene‡ – – – 131 529 126 037 124 814
Data reproduced with permission from Deutsches IVF Register (2004), www.deutsches-ivf-register.de.
†To adjust for variations in demand that occurred during the period prior to the co-payment introduction, we performed a secondary elasticity analysis using the average 5 year volumes for
IVF and ICSI from 1999 to 2003. The average 5 year cycle volumes for IVF and ICSI used in the secondary analyses were 26 265 and 30 191, respectively.
‡Clomifene volumes are aggregated quarterly sales data provided by IMS Germany.
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treatments. Using the cross-price elasticity of demand approach helps us
to understand whether two products are substitutes for each other (i.e.
interchangeable), complements of each other in that they are consumed
together or consumed completely independent of one another. Although
clomifene is not entirely interchangeable with IVF/ICSI, it is conceivable
that price increases along a continuum of care could inﬂuence demand
for treatments used early in the treatment pathway and outside of the
control of gynaecologists.
The same formula used to calculate the price-elasticity of demand was
used to calculate the cross-price elasticity for clomifene. The difference is
that the change in patient demand was based on changes in clomifene sales
volumes between 2003 (Q1) and 2004 (Q2) to derive DQ and Qav
(Table I). The same co-payment changes P2–P1 ¼ DP for IVF/ICSI from
January 2004 onwards were used in the denominator for estimating the
cross-price elasticities. The convention applied to cross-price elasticities
is that a positive (þ) value indicates that two products are substitutes
(i.e. can be interchanged), a negative (2) value suggests two products
are complements and a ratio of zero or near zero indicates that patient
demand for the two products are independent of one another. The
annualized clomifene volumes were provided by IMS Germany and are
shown in Table I.
Patient co-payment changes
Prior to 2004, within the public reimbursement system couples were eli-
gible for up to four IVF/ICSI cycles including pharmaceuticals, with 100%
reimbursement. In January 2004, the German healthcare modernization
law requires couples to pay 50% of all costs attributed to IVF/ICSI, includ-
ing medicines (Gesundheitssystem-Modernisierungsgesetz, 2003). The
cost per treatment cycle in 2004 varied between clinics, however,
average co-payment estimates of approximately E1500 and E2000 per
cycle for IVF and ICSI, respectively, have been reported by different
sources (Schmeilzl and Kru¨ger, 2006; Thaele and Uszkoreit, 2007). The
increased costs faced by consumers were used to estimate the
price-elasticities of demand for IVF and ICSI in relation to observed
changes in demand. Indirect costs associated with consuming IVF/ICSI
were not used in the calculations as there is unlikely to be any variation
in these following the policy change.
Results
The price elasticity of demand based on observed changes from 2003
to 2004 for IVF and ICSI were 20.41 and 20.34, respectively
(Table II). Based on the average 5-year change prior to the 2004
policy reform, we estimated price-elasticities for IVF and ICSI at
20.38 and 20.09, respectively (Table I). The price-elasticity for IVF
and ICSI together was 20.36 based on the 1 year comparison and
20.21 based on the combined 5 year average demand before the
co-payment.
The cross-price elasticity for the demand in clomiphene treatment
following the IVF and ICSI co-payment introduction was 20.01,
suggesting no relationship in the demand curves for these products.
Discussion
In this study, we report the short-run (12-month) price-elasticity of
demand for fertility treatments following a policy change that resulted
in the introduction of consumer co-payments for IVF and ICSI in
Germany. Speciﬁcally, we demonstrate that introducing a co-payment
resulted in elasticities of 20.41 and 20.34 based on changes in
demand between 2003 and 2004 for IVF and ICSI, respectively, with
a combined IVF/ICSI price-elasticity estimate at 1 year of 20.36.
Because demand for IVF and ICSI is often dependent on the different
causes of infertility attributed to females and males, respectively, it is
likely that the combined elasticity estimates best reﬂects the
price-elasticity of demand for couples.
One interpretation of our elasticity ﬁnding is that a 10% price
increase for IVF and ICSI will result in a reduction in demand
between 4.1 and 3.4% or 3.6% for IVF/ICSI combined. However,
our ﬁndings are most likely applicable over the short-run based on a
single price change from no fees to E1500–2000 over a 12-month
period. It is important to note that over longer time periods, these
observations may not hold true as a range of factors that can inﬂuence
the supply and demand for fertility treatments are likely to change over
time. Furthermore, the extrapolation of this ﬁnding to other markets is
dependent on similar characteristics to those found in Germany such
as treatment accessibility, living standards, disease perception and con-
sumer costs, to name a few.
The standard convention applied to price-elasticity of demand esti-
mates by economists would suggest that demand for IVF and ICSI are
relatively inelastic. In other words, the percentage change in quantity
demanded is less than the percentage change in price over the
same period, and as a consequence demand is not associated
closely with price changes for the price points tested (no fees to
E1500–2000) over a 12 months period. Of course, this conclusion
is implausible, given the 53% reduction in IVF/ICSI cycles within
12-months following the introduction of the co-payment, which
suggests that demand is highly price-sensitive (Griesinger et al.,
2007). The inelasticity of demand for IVF/ICSI that we describe can
be explained by an even larger percentage increase in the price than
the percentage reduction in services demanded. By convention, if
demand for IVF/ICSI were ‘elastic’ (i.e. sensitive to price with elasticity
[Ed] . 1.0) the reduction in treatment cycles (i.e. demand) following
the co-payment introduction would have been much larger than was
observed in 2004. In fact, in order to describe the demand for
IVF/ICSI as elastic (i.e. [Ed] . 1.0) under the circumstances of an
increase in cost starting at zero, there would have had to been
almost a complete discontinuation of IVF/ICSI in 2004.
Previous studies have estimated price elasticities for IVF using inter-
national cost-per cycle comparisons and utilization rates in different
countries (Collins et al., 1995; Chambers et al., 2009). Price-elasticities
are ideally calculated when a price change occurs in isolation of other
changes that are likely to inﬂuence demand, therefore allowing the
possibility to measure the inﬂuence of price alone on changes in
........................................................................................
Table II Price-elasticity of demand for IVF and ICSI
following introduction of patient co-payments
Price elasticity (change
from 2003 to 2004)
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demand. As identiﬁed in previous studies, when IVF elasticities are
measured across different countries, it is difﬁcult to account for the
numerous differences in culture, access to services and disease per-
ception that may exist between countries and inﬂuence demand for
IVF and ICSI irrespective of price (Collins et al., 1995; Chambers
et al., 2009). In our study, we have been able to isolate the effects
of price by measuring changes in demand over a 12-month period
immediately following the introduction of a patient co-payment in
the same country when all other factors would have likely remained
constant. Therefore our study could more accurately estimate the
impact of introducing a co-payment on the demand for treatment
than could a study which compares differences in service utilization
and prices across different countries.
The elasticity results described in this article are consistent with
research exploring the impact of price changes on demand in other
areas of healthcare. The most common observation is that demand
for healthcare is not responsive to price (i.e. inelastic) with elasticities
normally ,1.0 (Ringel et al., 2005). Reviewers of the elasticity litera-
ture also highlight that price is more likely to inﬂuence an individual’s
decision or ability to access treatment, rather than the frequency of
visits once treatment has been accessed (Ringel et al., 2005). If this
observation holds true for IVF/ICSI, then this might suggest that
price increases can impact the number of people willing or able to
access care and less so the number of treatment cycles per couple
for those able to access treatment to begin with. The potentially dis-
criminating effects of price increases that inﬂuence who can access fer-
tility treatment based on ability to pay has obvious equity concerns
(King and Meyer, 1997).
The cross-price elasticity for clomifene was near zero indicating that
this low cost treatment was not being substituted for IVF and ICSI.
Although most gynaecologists recognize that clomifene and IVF/ICSI
are used in different populations, because they are often used along
a continuum of fertility care, it was useful to see whether introducing
a co-payment inﬂuenced treatment progression decisions for patients
who may have commenced therapy on clomifene and previously
would have advanced to IVF or ICSI. This is especially important
because the prescription of clomifene often occurs outside of the
control of gynaecologists and it is important to know how other
prescribers may have responded to the IVF/ICSI co-payment change.
Dealing with an overnight introduction of cost for services, where
P1 ¼ E0, does not occur under normal market conditions and
requires special considerations. For example, in this study DP will
always be ‘2’ as long as P1 ¼ E0. This is a function of the accepted
mid-point equation used and represents the upper limit of the
changes in prices observed. Challenging the validity of the equation
is beyond the scope of this article, and for this analysis we accept
that the equation is valid and cite several references to support its
application. However, we note that when substitute values, within
reason, are used for P1 the main conclusions reported in this article
do not change. Perhaps the signiﬁcance of this debate is that it high-
lights the challenges in measuring changes in demand for IVF/ICSI in
relation to price changes. It also highlights the need to better under-
stand these relationships and how price signals inﬂuence consumer
response, especially as it seems likely that increasing costs-to-patients
will become more common for a wide range of medical procedures
because of cost pressures arising from ageing populations and the
introduction of expensive new technologies.
A limitation of this study is the inability to discriminate between the
proportion of IVF/ICSI cycles delivered through the public system and
those in the private insurance system. In this analysis, we used annual
IVF and ICSI data provided by the DIR which includes aggregated
public and private cycles. However, estimates suggest that the
percentage of private cycles is approximately 10–20%, with the
majority of cycles receiving public reimbursement (GBE, 2006; IGES,
2009). From January 2004, cycles performed within the public
system were subject to the newly introduced co-payment, however,
the policy change had no immediate bearing on costs within the
private system. For IVF/ICSI cycles delivered through the private
market, we are unable to establish how prices may have responded
to the introduction of co-payments in the public system. Because
public and private cycles are reported in aggregate, the changes
in demand used to calculate the elasticities reported here likely reﬂects
demand changes in the public system. This might suggest the demand
change in the public market was even greater because demand was
stabilized to some extent by privately reimbursed treatment cycles.
For example, if private cycles were not included in the aggregated
DIR data, then one might have expected to see an even greater
reduction in the IVF/ICSI cycles conducted in the public sector.
A second weakness is that we are unable to establish whether
price increases had a greater affect on ﬁrst or subsequent attempts
for conception using IVF/ICSI. This issue will be explored in future
work.
Conclusions
This study reports the price elasticity of demand following policy
interventions that introduced patient co-payments for IVF and ICSI.
By convention the price-elasticity results described here suggest that
IVF and ICSI are price inelastic for the price points tested (no fees
to E1500–2000) over a 12 month period, in that demand for treat-
ment is relatively responsive to changes to price. This ﬁnding is
mostly applicable over the short-run and is likely to vary over longer
time periods as different factors that can inﬂuence the supply and
demand for fertility treatments change over time. Additionally, the
transferability of this ﬁnding is likely most applicable to industrialized
countries with similar disease prevalence, accessibility to treatment,
prevailing religion and similar economic conditions to those found in
Germany. The major weaknesses of our study are the fact that our
results are based on aggregated data and the inability to differentiate
between private and public provision. Despite these weaknesses, we
believe our elasticity estimates are a useful contribution to under-
standing the relationship between costs faced by consumers and
demand for fertility treatments over the short-run.
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